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Forfeiture and the Land Installment
Contract: Sebastian v. Floyd
INTRODUCTION
In 1979, the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Sebastian v.
Floyd1 made sweeping changes in the law of forfeiture under
the land installment contract.' Citing a modern trend among
American jurisdictions and a concern that the buyer's equity
in the property be protected, the Court held the land sales
contract was analogous to a conventional mortgage,3 "thus re-
quiring a seller to seek a judicial sale of the property upon the
buyer's default."'4 In so holding, the Court rejected the tradi-
tional remedy available under contract law which would have
allowed enforcement of the forfeiture clause by the express
terms of the contract.5
Sebastian comports with a modern trend toward amelio-
rating the harshness of a forfeiture.6 However, Sebastian does
1 585 S.W.2d 381 (Ky. 1979). See generally Bondurant & Arvin, Kentucky Law
Survey-Real Property, 69 Ky. L.J. 625, 642-44 (1980-81) (presenting a brief discus-
sion of the case).
2 See 585 S.W.2d at 383-84. See also text accompanying notes 51-83 infra for a
discussion of Sebastian. The land installment contract is sometimes referred to as
land sales contract, contract for deed, long term land contract, or contract and bond
for deed.
See 585 S.W.2d at 383.
4Id.
1 See, e.g., Miles v. Proffitt, 266 S.W.2d 333 (Ky. 1954); Kravitz v. Grimm, 115
S.W.2d 368 (Ky. 1938); G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE
LAW § 3.26 (1979) [hereinafter cited as OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN]; Note, Forfei-
ture and the Iowa Installment Land Contract, 46 IOWA L. REV. 786, 788 (1961); Com-
ment, Forfeiture: The Anomaly of the Land Sale Contract, 41 ALB. L. REv. 71, 79-83
(1977).
6 Various approaches, both statutory and judicial, have been developed to miti-
gate the harshness of forfeiture. A number of states have enacted statutes with spe-
cific notice requirements combined with "grace periods" during which a seller must
accept payment from a defaulting buyer. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 656.2 (West
1950) (30-day grace period); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 559.21 (West Supp. 1983) (up to 60
days grace period depending on percentage contract price paid); N.D. CENT. CODE §
32-18-04 (1976) (maximum one year grace period); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-50-
03 (1979) (grace period set by court, but not less than 10 days). While the harshness
of forfeiture under these statutes is reduced, it is not eliminated.
In other states, absent statutory guidance, courts have taken various approaches
to protect the buyer from the harshness of forfeiture. Some courts have reasoned that
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not merely mitigate the unfairness of forfeiture; rather, the
possibility of forfeiture is eliminated altogether.' In effect, the
Kentucky Supreme Court has gone further, without legislative
authority, toward converting the land installment contract
into a mortgage than any other jurisdiction in the country.'
The significance of Sebastian lies in the popularity of the
land installment contract as an alternative to the conventional
mortgage for financing real estate transactions.' This popular-
ity results from certain advantages the land installment con-
the acceptance of late payments by a seller constitutes a waiver of the right to forfei-
ture. See, e.g., Woods v. Monticello Dev. Co., 656 P.2d 1324 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982);
Allabastro v. Wheaton Nat'l Bank, 395 N.E.2d 1212 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Aden v. Al-
wardt, 394 N.E.2d 716 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Krentz v. Johnson, 343 N.E.2d 165 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1976). Other jurisdictions have granted the buyer a final opportunity, not-
withstanding default, to pay the outstanding balance, or, in some cases, the arrear-
ages. See, e.g., Key v. Gregory, 553 S.W.2d 329 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Call v. Timber
Lakes Corp., 567 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977).
Still other courts enforce the forfeiture provision but allow restitution to the ex-
tent that the buyer's payments exceed actual damages. See, e.g., Johnson v. Carman,
572 P.2d 371 (Utah 1977); Kay v. Wood, 549 P.2d 709 (Utah 1976) (forfeiture clause
held unenforceable to the extent forfeiture would be excessive or disproportionate to
any possible loss); Jacobson v. Swan, 278 P.2d 294 (Utah 1954). Finally, a few courts
have moved toward treating the land installment contract as an "equitable mortgage"
requiring adherence to mortgage foreclosure procedures. See, e.g., Skendzel v. Mar-
shall, 301 N.E.2d 641 (Ind. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974), appeal after
remand, 339 N.E.2d 57 (Ind. 1975); Bean v. Walker, 464 N.Y.S.2d 895 (App. Div.
1983); Anderson Contracting Co. v. Daughtery, 417 A.2d 1227 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
See generally, Lewis & Reeves, How the Doctrine of Equitable Conversion Affects
Land Sale Contract Forfeitures, 3 REAL EST. L.J. 249, 259-60 (1974-75); Nelson &
Whitman, The Installment Land Contract-A National Viewpoint, 1977 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 541, 561-62.
" See 585 S.W.2d at 384.
' This conclusion was reached after a review of relevant cases and statutes from
other jurisdictions. Until the Kentucky Supreme Court decision in Sebastian, the In-
diana Supreme Court decision in Skendzel v. Marshall, 301 N.E.2d at 641, came clos-
est to treating land installment contracts as mortgages without statutory authority.
See notes 85-95 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of Skendzel. Other
states taking this position have done so pursuant to specific statutory authority. See,
e.g., MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 10-101 to -108 (1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §
11A (West Supp. 1983). See note 101 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Oklahoma statute.
9 The land installment contract is the most commonly used substitute for the
mortgage. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 6, at 541. The device is also widely used in
Kentucky. Interview with John C. Wolff, Ed.D., Executive Director, Kentucky Real
Estate and Education Center (Nov. 9, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Wolff interview].
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tract offers to both buyers and sellers,"0 despite potential
problems associated with its use.-" Land installment contracts
are frequently used in a "tight money market" or when a
buyer does not have the requisite credit rating to acquire the
downpayment for a deed or mortgage transaction.' As an ad-
vantage to the buyer, the land installment contract usually
provides for a smaller downpayment.13 The seller is usually
willing to agree to this smaller amount because of possible
savings in capital gains tax4 and, more importantly, because
of the ease and efficiency of regaining possession of the prop-
erty through automatic forfeiture when the buyer defaults.,5
After Sebastian, a seller who finds a buyer in default has
10 See Comment, supra note 5, at 74-75; Comment, Remedying the Inequities of
Forfeiture in Land Installment Contracts, 64 IOWA L. REv. 158, 162 (1978). See text
accompanying notes 19-38 infra for a discussion of the popularity of the land install-
ment contract.
" This Comment is primarily concerned with the problem of forfeiture. But the
land installment contract creates other inequities as well. These include: (1) the supe-
riority of a federal tax lien over the vendee's lien; (2) the bankruptcy trustee's power
to cancel the contract because it is executory; (3) the difficulties arising when the
contract is not recorded and a bona fide purchaser subsequently buys the land; (4)
the vendee's lien inferiority to the seller's vendor's lien. For a general discussion of
the land installment contract see OSBORNE, NELSON & WHrrMAN, supra note 5, at §§
3.25-.32.
" Comment, supra note 10, at 163; telephone interview with Ginny Lawson, real
estate broker in Lexington, Ky. (Nov. 5, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Lawson inter-
view]; Wolff interview, supra note 9.
1" The downpayment on a land installment contract is usually less than a
straight commercial mortgage downpayment. The land installment contract typically
provides for a downpayment of 5-20% of the total contract price, while most com-
mercial mortgages require 20-40%. See Comment, supra note 10, at 163. See also
Comment, supra note 5, at 75 (20-35% required as mortgage downpayment). How-
ever, the downpayment on some mortgages is quite low. For example, Farmer's Home
Administration (FHA) mortgages require only four to five percent as downpayment.
Depending on the type of mortgage involved and the way the land installment con-
tract is set up, the installment contract alternative may not provide for a smaller
downpayment. Lawson interview, supra note 12.
14 I.R.C. § 453 (West Supp. 1983) provides an exception to the general rule that
gains derived from the disposition of property must be reported in the year of dispo-
sition. This installment method exception allows the taxpayer to recognize for any
one taxable year only "that proportion of the payments received in that year which
the gross profit ... bears to the total contract price." I.R.C. § 465(c). This spreading
of payments over several years often results in lower tax payments. Lawson interview,
supra note 12. See also Comment, supra note 10, at 163.
15 OSBORNE, NELSON & WHrrMAN, supra note 5, at § 3.25; Lewis & Reeves, supra
note 6, at 253-54.
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but one option-a judicial sale."6 Although the buyer is af-
forded greater protection by the decision, the seller is forced
to do what he hoped to avoid-undergo a costly and time con-
suming judicial proceeding to enforce his rights. 17 This sub-
stantial reallocation of rights in favor of the buyer raises seri-
ous questions as to the land installment contract's continued
viability in Kentucky real estate financing.' The Court, in at-
tempting to protect the buyer's rights and interests, may have
destroyed the attractiveness of the contract to the seller; cer-
tain situations still exist where forfeiture should be allowed.
This Comment will suggest alternatives to the Sebastian deci-
sion which preserve the land installment contract and ade-
quately protect the interests of both parties.
I. THE LAND INSTALLMENT CONTRACT
The land installment contract is the most widely used al-
ternative to the conventional mortgage. 9 It is especially popu-
lar in those states whose substantive laws are considered pro-
mortgagor.2 0 The land installment contract and the purchase
11 See 585 S.W.2d at 384. Judicial foreclosure is the only foreclosure method per-
mitted under Kentucky law. Ky. REV. STAT. § 426.525 (Bobbs-Merrill Cam. Supp.
1983) [hereinafter cited as KRS] forbids foreclosure of a mortgage. The prohibition of
this section refers to the practice of "strict foreclosure," which does not require judi-
cial sale, and is used in a minority of jurisdictions. Under "strict foreclosure," if the
mortgagor does not pay off the debt within a specified period of time, title to the
property automatically vests in the mortgagee without a sale. See OSBOREn, NELSON
& WHITMAN, supra note 5, at §§ 7.9-.10.
'7 Foreclosure procedure requires that the mortgagee file a court action and ob-
tain a judgment for the sale of the property. See KRS § 426.526 (1982). Certain other
statutory provisions must also be met including notice requirements and property
appraisal. See KRS §§ 424.370, 426.520, 426.526 (1972). If the judicial sale fails to
bring two-thirds of the property's appraised value, then the mortgagee may redeem
the property within one year of the day of sale by paying the purchaser the original
purchase money plus ten percent interest. See KRS § 426.530 (1982).
"8 See notes 78-84 infra and accompanying text. See also Greater Louisville First
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Etzler, 30 Ky. L. SUMM. 10, at 6 (Ky. Ct. App. Sept. 1,
1983) (land installment contract activates a "due on sale" in a prior mortgage) [here-
inafter cited as KLS].
11 See OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 5, at § 3.25.
20 For example, a substantial number of states require judicial foreclosure as the
only method of foreclosing a mortgage. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 702.01-.09 (1969); IND.
CODE § 32-8-16-1 (1976) as modified by IND. RULE TR. P. 69(c); IOWA CODE §§ 654.1-
.15 (1950); MICH. CoMP. LAWS. ANN. § 600.3101 (West 1968); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
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money mortgage both serve the same economic function-the
seller financing the unpaid portion of the real estate purchase
price.21 However, they differ in other respects. 22 Under the
land installment contract, the purchaser normally takes pos-
session and pays monthly installments until the entire princi-
pal plus interest is paid.2 The purchaser is typically responsi-
ble for taxes, casualty insurance, and upkeep of the premises'
during the contract period, but the seller retains legal title to
the premises until the full purchase price has been paid, at
which time full title is conveyed to the purchaser.24 Con-
versely, in a mortgage transaction, the seller conveys full title
to the purchaser when the agreement is executed, but reserves
9 lien against the property as security for payment of the bal-
ance due on the purchase price.2
The land installment contract should- also be distin-
guished from the short-term executory or earnest money con-
tract which is used primarily to establish the rights and obli-
gations of the parties between the date of the bargain and the
date of closing, usually one to two months.2 6 At closing, title
passes to the buyer, any security agreements are consum-
mated, and the earnest money contract ends.27 In contrast,
the land installment contract governs the parties throughout
the life of the debt.28
The distinguishing feature of a land installment contract
2323.07 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 686 (West 1960); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§
278.01-.18 (West 1958). Cf. N.Y. REAL PROPERTY AcT. § 1401 (McKinney 1979) (a
mortgage can vest the power to sell in a third party). See generally Nelson & Whit-
man, supra note 6, at 543.
Kentucky falls into this pro-mortgagor category because a foreclosure requires a
judicial proceeding. See KRS § 426.525.
21 See OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 5, at § 3.25; Nelson & Whit-
man, supra note 6, at 541; Comment, supra note 10, at 160-61.
22 For an excellent general discussion of various real estate financing devices and
the use of real estate credit see R. BARLOWE, LAND RESOURCE ECONOMICS-THE Eco-
NOMICS OF REAL ESTATE (3d ed. 1978).
2S OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 5, at § 3.25.
24 Id.
21 Id. at § 1. See R. BARLOWE, supra note 22, at 511-21.
2, OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 5, at § 3.25.
27 Id.
28 Id.
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is its forfeiture provision.29 Although a number of traditional
remedies are available to the seller upon default of the pur-
chaser,30 these are time consuming and expensive, and they
require judicial proceedings.3 1 The forfeiture provision usually
provides that "time is of the essence" and that if a purchaser
violates a provision of the contract, the seller may terminate
the contract, regain possession, and retain any installments al-
ready paid as rent and liquidated damages.32
The forfeiture provision has led to harsh and unfair re-
sults.33 This is especially true where the buyer has built up
substantial equity in the property and stands to lose his entire
investment because of one late payment.3 4 "The anomaly of
forfeiture is that the more the purchaser pays, the less the
seller's need for security, yet the greater the impact of
forfeiture."3 "
29 A typical example of a forfeiture provision in a land installment contract is
found in Miles v. Proffitt, 266 S.W.2d 333, 336 (Ky. 1954).
It is understood and agreed that should the party of the second part
[buyer] fail to pay any of his above mentioned obligations promptly when
the same shall become due, that then and in that event the parties of the
first part [sellers] may declare the entire unpaid balance, both principal
and interest, to be at once due and payable, and may at their option termi-
nate this contract, and it is further agreed that in such event any amount
which shall have been paid by the party of the second part [buyer] shall be
considered as rent and liquidated damages, and shall be retained by the
parties of the first part [sellers] ....
The party of the second part [buyer] covenants and agrees . . . that
should he fail to fully comply with any and all of the covenants and agree-
ments herein contained by him to be kept and performed that he will
thereupon promptly surrender possession of said property to the parties of
the first part [sellers] upon demand being made by them.
Id. at 336 (emphasis added).
See also Skendzel v. Marshall, 301 N.E.2d 641, 643 (Ind. 1973) (citing one of
many variations of the forfeiture/liquidated damages provision).
30 The seller may sue "(1) for the installments which are due with interest
thereon; (2) for specific performance of the contract; (3) for damages for the breach;
(4) to foreclose his vendee's rights; (5) to quiet title; or if he should desire, he may
merely rescind the contract." Comment, Installment Contracts for the Sale of Land
in Missouri, 24 Mo. L. REv. 240, 243 (1959).
31 See Comment, supra note 5, at 79-91.
3' Nelson & Whitman, supra note 6, at 542.
33 See Comment, supra note 5, at 72; Comment, supra note 10, at 158.
" See text accompanying notes 80-84 infra for a discussion of the harshness of
forfeiture.
25 Comment, supra note 5, at 102.
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This inequity has led to both legislative and judicial in-
tervention to ameliorate the harshness of forfeiture.36 Because
so many approaches have been taken, it is difficult to analyze
results in the area.3 7 Not only does the law vary from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction, but results vary within a jurisdiction de-
pending on the particular facts involved.38
II. THE KENTUCKY APPROACH BEFORE Sebastian
Prior to the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Se-
bastian v. Floyd,39 the enforcement of forfeiture provisions in
land installment contracts in Kentucky was governed by con-
tract law. 0 Because the express terms of the contract were
agreed upon by the parties and included the forfeiture provi-
sion, courts felt compelled to carry out the intentions of the
parties, even if the buyer suffered substantial loss."' Early
Kentucky case law illustrates this approach. 2
36 Id. at 102-09. See notes 85-103 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of
legislative and judicial efforts to ameliorate the harshness of forfeiture.
37 As one authority has observed, "the law in this area is not susceptible to or-
derly analysis." See OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 5, at § 3.27.
36 Power, Land Contracts as Security Devices, 12 WAYNE L. REV. 391, 416
(1966). Compare Thomas v. Klein, 577 P.2d 1153 (Idaho 1978) (refusing to enforce a
forfeiture clause and requiring a judicial sale of the property) with Ellis v. Butter-
field, 570 P.2d 1334 (Idaho 1977) (enforcing the forfeiture clause). The same court
reached different results despite the factual similarity of the two cases. In Ellis, the
buyer had paid $8,124 of the principal, which was 47% of the $17,232 contract price.
Additionally, the buyer had paid almost $7,000 interest. Although the payment was
only six days late, the forfeiture provision was enforced with the seller retaining pay-
ments as rent and liquidated damages. 570 P.2d at 1339. Thomas involved larger
monetary amounts, but similar proportions. In Thomas, $97,000 (approximately
60%) of the $160,000 purchase price had been paid. Moreover, approximately $60,000
in interest had been paid. Here, a judicial sale was required. 577 P.2d at 1155. While
the majority in Thomas attempted to reconcile the two cases, one justice found the
cases factually indistinguishable and the results inconsistent. Id. at 1157 (Blistine, J.,
concurring in the result and dissenting).
39 585 S.W.2d 381 (Ky. 1979).
40 See, e.g., Ward Real Estate v. Childers, 3 S.W.2d 601 (Ky. 1928). For a more
thorough discussion of the history of the contract approach to forfeiture in land in-
stallment contracts, and its application in other jurisdictions, see OSBORNE, NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 5, at § 3.26; Lewis & Reeves, supra note 6, at 256-57; Comment,
supra note 5, at 79-83; Comment, supra note 10, at 167-77.
41 Courts took the view that "[t]he law will leave the parties to stand where they
have voluntarily placed themselves." Comment, supra note 5, at 83.
4' See notes 43-50 infra and accompanying text.
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In Ward Real Estate v. Childers," the Kentucky Court of
Appeals allowed a seller to retain earnest money advanced by
a defaulting buyer under a short-term executory contract.",
The Court followed a well-established line of authority hold-
ing that a party in default would not be able to benefit from
his own breach where the other party was ready and willing to
perform.45
Kravitz v. Grimms,4 6 a 1938 decision, marked the first
time that the Kentucky Court of Appeals addressed the for-
feiture issue in the context of a land installment contract. In
Kravitz, the buyer, at the time of the default, had paid
twenty-six percent of the purchase price and had been in pos-
session of the property for over two years.47 The Court, rely-
ing on the rationale expressed in Ward Real Estate, upheld
the forfeiture.48 The Kentucky Court of Appeals again upheld
the forfeiture clause in Miles v. Proffitt.49 Here, the seller was
allowed to retain the amount already paid on the contract
price, approximately thirteen percent, as rent and liquidated
damages. 50 Kravitz and Miles represent the only Kentucky
cases addressing the forfeiture issue prior to the decision of
the Kentucky Supreme Court in Sebastian. Both times, the
Court applied contract law in upholding the forfeiture.
III. Sebastian v. Floyd
The 1979 Kentucky Supreme Court decision in Sebastian
Is 3 S.W.2d at 601.
'4 See id.
" Id. at 602. The Court noted:
[I]t is a rule supported by the great weight of authority that a party to
an agreement to purchase property who has advanced money in part per-
formance at the agreement, and then refused to proceed to the ultimate
conclusion of the agreement, the other party being ready and willing to per-
form his part of the contract, is not entitled to recover his part of the
money so advanced.
Id.
46 115 S.W.2d 368 (Ky. 1938).
47 Id. at 369.
48 Id. at 371 (citing 3 S.W.2d at 602).
49 266 S.W.2d 333 (Ky. 1954).
80 Id. at 337.
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v. Floyd5 marked a radical departure from existing Kentucky
law governing the enforcement of forfeiture clauses in land in-
stallment contracts.2 Faced with the question of "whether a
clause in an installment land sale contract providing for for-
feiture of the buyer's payments upon default may be enforced
by the seller, 53 the Court answered in the negative.54 In re-
fusing to uphold the forfeiture provision by applying contract
law, the Court formulated a new approach to forfeiture, and
overruled Miles v. Proffitt55 and Kravitz v. Grimm.5 6
Sebastian involved a land installment contract for the
purchase of a house and lot for $10,900.17 The buyer paid
$3,800 down, the balance to be paid in monthly installments
of $120. After twenty-one months, the buyer had paid approx-
imately forty percent of the principal, but had missed seven
payments. The seller filed suit seeking a judgment of $700 for
payments owed, plus amounts due for taxes and insurance.
The seller also sought an enforcement of the forfeiture provi-
sion of the contract. Both the trial court and court of appeals
allowed the forfeiture and terminated the contract.58 The Su-
preme Court of Kentucky reversed, holding the land install-
ment contract was in essence a mortgage requiring a judicial
sale as the sole remedy.59
In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that no
practical distinction exists between the land sale contract and
a purchase money mortgage.60 In both situations, the signifi-
cant feature is that the seller is financing the buyer's purchase
of the property, using the property as collateral for the loan.61
51 585 S.W.2d 381 (Ky. 1979).
52 See text accompanying notes 39-50 supra for a discussion of Kentucky law
governing the enforcement of forfeiture clauses prior to Sebastian.
53 585 S.W.2d at 382.
5' See id. at 384.
-5 266 S.W.2d 333 (Ky. 1954). See 585 S.W.2d at 384 (overruling Miles to the
extent that Miles upholds forfeitures in installment land contracts).
56 115 S.W.2d 368 (Ky. 1938). See 585 S.W.2d at 384 (overruling Kravitz to the
extent that Kravitz upholds forfeitures in contracts).
17 585 S.W.2d at 382.
58 Id.
5' See id. at 384.
,0 See id. at 383. See generally R. BARLowE, supra note 22, at 501-29.
61 585 S.W.2d at 383.
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When the land installment contract is entered into, equitable
title passes to the buyer, while "bare legal title" remains with
the seller.12 This legal title is in the nature of a security inter-
est in the property, analogous to the lien in a conventional
mortgage.1
3
The Court reasoned that because the land installment
contract and purchase money mortgage are functional
equivalents, the interests of both buyer and seller will be best
protected by a rule treating the seller's interest as a mort-
gage. 4 Under Kentucky mortgage law, a judicial sale is the
sole remedy in case of default. 5 Under this remedy, the seller
receives the balance due on the contract, plus expenses, from
the proceeds of the sale. The buyer receives any excess over
that amount.6 7
The Court distinguished the land installment contract
from the typical short-term executory contract involving an
earnest money deposit. 8 This deposit is usually no more than
ten percent of the contract price. 9 Forfeiture of the earnest
money deposit as liquidated damages upon a buyer's default
is allowed, because the damages bear a "reasonable relation to
the actual damages suffered by the seller, which damages
would be difficult to ascertain. '7 0
The Court believed the judicial sale would adequately
protect the expectations and interests of the seller: "[T]he
seller will receive the balance due on the contract, plus ex-
11 Id. at 382; Henkenberns v. Hauck, 236 S.W.2d 703, 704 (Ky. 1951).
63 585 S.W.2d at 383. See R. BARLOWE, supra note 22, at 511-12.
See 585 S.W.2d at 383.
6' See KRS § 426.525. See also notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text for a
discussion of judicial foreclosure in Kentucky.
11 The seller has the following statutory rights, inter alia: attorney's fees, KRS §
453.250 (Cum. Supp. 1983); recoupment of expenses incurred in preserving or main-
taining property abandoned by the mortgagor, KRS § 426.525 (Cum. Supp. 1983);
and unlimited interest rates on principal sums of more than $15,000, KRS §
360.010(1) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
6 585 S.W.2d at 383; KRS § 426.500 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
See 585 S.W.2d at 383.
11 Id. R. BARLOWE, supra note 22, at 460-61.
70 585 S.W.2d at 383. See Robert F. Simmons & Assocs. v. Urban Renewal &
Community Dev. Agency, 497 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Ky. 1973); Graves v. Winer, 351
S.W.2d 193, 196 (Ky. 1961); Ward Real Estate v. Childers, 3 S.W.2d 601, 601-02 (Ky.
1928).
[Vol. 72
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penses, thus fulfilling the expectations he had when he agreed
to sell the land. '71 However, there are at least two problems
with this conclusion. First, the Court incorrectly presumed the
ease and efficiency of forfeiture equivalent to a costly and
lengthy judicial proceeding. Following the Court's reasoning,
the expectations of the seller are equally served by either rem-
edy. Such is not the case. One of the primary reasons a seller
uses a land installment contract is to avoid the time and ex-
pense of the judicial foreclosure required in a mortgage con-
text.72 This is particularly true where the transaction involves
a low-income, "high-risk" buyer with a higher probability of
default.73
Second, the Court's decision is based on the assumption
that a judicial sale will produce sufficient revenues to compen-
sate the seller for the amount due under the contract, plus
expenses, with any excess going to the buyer. In reality prop-
erty sold through a judicial sale brings far less than its fair
market value.74 Often, the sale proceeds are not enough to sat-
isfy the seller's judgment, much less protect the buyer's eq-
uity.7 5 If the seller's judgment is not satisfied by the sale pro-
ceeds, then the buyer is personally responsible for the
deficiency.76 Again, particular risks exist for the seller where a
low-income buyer is involved.77
The practical effect of Sebastian will be to remove the
primary incentive for using a land installment contract as an
alternative to a mortgage. Without the benefits of a forfeiture
provision, a seller will be less willing to enter into such a con-
tract. Moreover, since the land installment contract has tradi-
tionally been the major financing device available to the high-
71 585 S.W.2d at 383.
7'2 Lewis & Reeves, supra note 6, at 252.
73 See Powell, Reforming the Vendor's Remedies for Breach of Installment
Land Sales Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 191 (1974).
7' Lawson interview, supra note 12.
76 Id.
76 KRS § 426.005(l) (1981) provides: "In an action to enforce a mortgage or lien,
judgment may be rendered for the sale of the property and for recovery of the debt
against the defendant personally." (emphasis added).
77 See Powell, supra note 73, at 191.
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risk buyer,78 Sebastian may leave an entire class of people
without a method for financing real estate, thus forcing the
low-income purchaser from the housing market. Surely this
result was unintended, especially since the Court's objective
was to provide the buyer with additional protection."'
In Sebastian, the Court responded to the legitimate need
to protect the buyer who has substantial equity in the prop-
erty from the harshness of forfeiture, and rightly so. Over
forty percent of the principal had been paid by the purchaser
in Sebastian prior to default.s0 The newly established rule is
relatively simple and straightforward: (1) a land installment
contract is the equivalent of a mortgage, and (2) a judicial sale
is the sole remedy.8 ' Forfeitures are thus eliminated.
However, this new rule lacks the flexibility necessary for
fair and just results in the myriad of situations where a buyer
defaults. Under the rule announced in Sebastian, a judicial
sale is required whether the buyer defaults after the first pay-
ment or near the last payment.8 2 But, situations exist where
equity should allow the forfeiture provision to be enforced.
The clearest example is where the buyer defaults after only a
few payments and has little or no equity in the property. In
this instance the Court's rationale in Sebastian is not served
by a rule disallowing forfeiture.'
A rule allowing forfeiture when the buyer's equity is small
strikes a reasonable balance between the rights of buyer and
seller. The viability and attractiveness of the land installment
contract is also preserved. At the beginning of the contract,
where the buyer's equity is low and the seller's risk is great,
forfeiture should be allowed. As the contract progresses, the
buyer builds equity in the property and the seller's risk is di-
minished. With this increase in equity comes a corresponding
78 Id.
7 See 585 S.W.2d at 382.
80 Id.
81 This rule was applied by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Gamble v. Bryant,
599 S.W.2d 472 (Ky. Ct. App.), discretionary rev. denied, 599 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1980).
82 See 585 S.W.2d at 384.
81 As of this writing the Kentucky Supreme Court has not had the opportunity
to apply the new rule to a fact situation where the buyer has little or no equity in the
property.
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increase in the need for security. Therefore, the buyer should
be afforded the greater protection of a mortgage. In other
words, the protections afforded the parties should at least
roughly correspond with the interests to be protected.84
The obvious question is where to draw the line-when
should the land installment contract be converted to a mort-
gage? Other jurisdictions have attempted to answer this ques-
tion through a variety of approaches.
IV. OTHER JURISDICTIONS
In reaching its conclusion in Sebastian, the Kentucky Su-
preme Court relied primarily on Skendzel v. Marshall,85 a
1973 Indiana Supreme Court decision. Skendzel marked the
first time the Indiana court applied the doctrine of equitable
mortgages to land installment contracts. 86 The decision com-
pletely revolutionized the law of forfeiture under the land in-
stallment contract in Indiana.8 7
Skendzel involved a land sales contract for $36,000.8 Af-
ter nine years of possession and a payment of $21,000 (58.33%
of the contract price), the buyer defaulted. 9 The seller sought
to enforce the forfeiture clauseY0 The Indiana Supreme Court
reversed a lower court decision upholding the forfeiture and
held: 1
A conditional land contract in effect creates a vendor's
lien in the property to secure the unpaid balance owed
under the contract. This lien is closely analogous to a mort-
gage-in fact, the vendor is commonly referred to as an "eq-
uitable mortgagee.". . . In view of this characterization of
81 See Comment, supra note 5, at 79-83.
81 301 N.E.2d 641 (Ind. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974), appeal after
remand, 339 N.E.2d 5 (Ind. 1975).
51 Id. at 650.
37 See Tidd v. Stauffer, 308 N.E.2d 415, 418 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974).
11 301 N.E.2d at 643. The contract contained a standard forfeiture/liquidated
damages provision which provided that, upon default by the buyer, the seller had the
option to keep all previously made payments as liquidated damages, terminate the





the vendor as a lien holder, it is only logical that such a hen
be enforced through foreclosure proceedings.2
The case was remanded to the trial court for a judicial sale of
the property 3
The Indiana court adopted a general rule that the land
installment contract would be treated as a mortgage, but not
the rule announced in Sebastian that forfeitures are per se
invalid.9 4 Based on equitable considerations, the court ex-
cepted from its holding breaches of contract in the following
limited situations: (1) abandonment of the property; (2) an
absconding buyer; (3) where a minimal amount has been paid
on the contract at the time of the default by the buyer and
the buyer seeks to retain possession while the seller is paying
taxes, insurance, and other upkeep in order to preserve the
property; and (4) "under circumstances in which it is found to
be consonant with notions of fairness and justice under the
law." 9
Since Skenzdel, the question of forfeiture has been ad-
dressed by several Indiana appellate courts. In the vast major-
ity of cases, a judicial sale was required because none of the
limited exceptions were held applicable. 6 In none of the cases
requiring a judicial sale had the buyer paid less than 29.7 % of
92 Id. at 648 (citations omitted). The quote cited in the text is the one used by
the Kentucky Court in Sebastian. See Sebastian v. Floyd, 585 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Ky.
1979).
93 301 N.E.2d at 651. As in Kentucky, judicial sale is the only foreclosure remedy
in Indiana. See IND. CODE § 32-8-16-1 as modified by IND. RULE TR. P. 69(c).
"' Instead the Indiana court stated: "[W]e are compelled to conclude that judi-
cial foreclosure of a land sale contract is in consonance with the notions of equity
developed in American jurisprudence .... This is not to suggest that a forfeiture is
an inappropriate remedy for the breach of all land contracts." 301 N.E.2d at 650.
95 Id.
" See, e.g., Morris v. Weigle, 383 N.E.2d 241 (Ind. 1978) (29.7% contract price
paid); Oles v. Plummer, 444 N.E.2d 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (30.55% of the contract
price paid upon breach); Ebersold v. Wise, 412 N.E.2d 802 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)
(40.4% contract price paid); McLendon v. Safe Realty Corp., 401 N.E.2d 80 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1980) (40% contract price paid); Ogle v. Wright, 360 N.E.2d 240 (Ind. Ct. App.
1977) (40% contract price paid); Bartlett v. Wise, 348 N.E.2d 652 (ind. Ct. App.
1976) (33% contract price paid); Tidd v. Stauffer, 308 N.E.2d at 416-17 (41% con-
tract price paid). Accord Dunfee v. Waite, 439 N.E.2d 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982);
Gorbett v. Estelle, 438 N.E.2d 766 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
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the contract price.17 The courts did not, however, announce a
minimum percentage below which a forfeiture would be
assured.
In two of the three cases where forfeiture was allowed,
more than thirty percent of the contract price had been paid
at the time of default." Various factors cited by the courts in
allowing forfeiture were common to all three cases. These fac-
tors included: (1) failure to make timely payments; (2) failure
to secure and maintain casualty insurance; (3) failure to main-
tain the premises in good repair; (4) waste and destruction of
property; and (5) abandonment.99
Although the court in Skendzel went a long way toward
converting the land installment contract into a mortgage, it
wisely avoided a blanket prohibition against all forfeitures.
Granted, a case-by-case examination of facts and circum-
stances is required, but the flexibility provided therein tends
to assure just and equitable results.'00
Apart from judicial lawmaking, several states have en-
acted laws which address the issue of forfeiture. Oklahoma
law, in one relatively short paragraph, treats all land install-
ment contracts as mortgages. 10' A Maryland statute prohibits
'" See note 96 supra.
" See Finley v. Chain, 374 N.E.2d 67, 72 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978), overruled on
other grounds, Morris v. Weigle, 383 N.E.2d at 345 (30.2% contract price paid); Don-
aldson v. Seilmer, 333 N.E.2d 862, 863 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975), overruled on other
grounds, 383 N.E.2d at 345 (30.54% contract price paid).
" Finley v. Chain, 374 N.E.2d at 72; Donaldson v. Sellmer, 333 N.E.2d at 863;
Goff v. Graham, 306 N.E.2d 758, 762 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974). Finley and Donaldson
were later overruled, but only to the extent that the court awarded the sellers dam-
ages for repair costs in excess of amounts paid by purchaser under the contract. See
383 N.E.2d at 345 n.3.
100 Sebastian also cites H & L Land Co. v. Warner, 258 So. 2d 293 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1972). Although Warner advances the idea that a land installment contract will
be treated as a mortgage, the case does little to support the holding in Sebastian.
First, the Florida court interpreted a state statute in reaching its conclusion. Id. at
296 (citing FLA. STAT. § 697.01 (1969)). Second, Warner involved specific performance
and a confusing and inconsistent blending of mortgage and contract law. Id. at 295.
See also OSBORNE, NELSON & WHrrMAN, supra note 5, at § 3.28.
10! The statute provides that land installment contracts
for purchase and sale of real property made for the purpose or with the
intention of receiving the payment of money and made for the purpose of
establishing an immediate and continuing right of possession of the de-
scribed real property, whether such instruments be from the debtor to the
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forfeiture where a land installment contract is used for the
sale of residential property to a noncorporate buyer.102 Ohio
legislation combines the "grace period" function with an addi-
tional requirement that either after five years or payment of
twenty percent of the purchase price, judicial foreclosure is
required. 03
Commentators have also contributed numerous sugges-
tions as to how the forfeiture issue should be handled. 0 4 Even
among those in general agreement that forfeiture should be
allowed in certain situations, there is wide disagreement as to
what percentage of the purchase price should be paid before
the buyer's rights are elevated to those of a mortgagor. The
suggestions range from as low as five percent 0 5 to as high as
fifty percent. 06 Within each approach is an attempt to bal-
ance the interests of both buyer and seller while maintaining
the land installment contract as a viable option for the low-
income buyer.
CONCLUSION
In Sebastian v. Floyd'07 the Kentucky Supreme Court
converted the land installment contract into a mortgage and
eliminated the possibility of forfeiture. 10 8 The resulting rigid
standard, although intended to benefit the buyer, may in fact
creditor or from the debtor to some third person in trust for the creditor,
shall to that extent be deemed and held mortgages, and shall be subject to
the same rules of foreclosure and to the same regulations, restraints and
forms as are prescribed in relation to mortgages.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § lA (emphasis added). Oklahoma, like Kentucky, permits
only judicial foreclosure. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 686.
102 See MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 10-101 to -108.
103 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5313.01-.10 (Page 1970).
104 See, e.g., Powell, supra note 73, at 224 (suggesting a five percent rule); Com-
ment, supra note 5, at 110 (suggesting a 15% rule); Comment, Florida Installment
Land Contracts, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 156, 187 (1975-76) (adopting a mortgage ap-
proach); Comment, supra note 10, at 180 (suggesting a 50% rule).
101 Powell, supra note 73, at 224.
106 Comment, supra note 10, at 180. But cf. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 6, at
561 (suggesting that, as an alternative approach, the modes of foreclosure commonly
used for mortgages be reformed to make them as inexpensive and as rapid as feasible,
consonant with due process and fairness).
107 585 S.W.2d 381 (Ky. 1979).
100 See id. at 383.
[Vol. 72
1983-84] FORFEITURE AND LAND INSTALLMENT CONTRACT 933
eliminate certain low-income buyers from the housing market.
The seller now has little incentive to enter into a land install-
ment contract with a high-risk buyer.109 Consequently, the
Court should adopt a more flexible approach which will allow
forfeiture in those situations necessary to assure fair and just
results. In turn, the viability of the land installment contract
will be preserved.
The Court should adopt a general rule converting the
land installment contract to a mortgage when the buyer has'
paid ten percent of the purchase price. The ten percent mark
is suggested because the Court has previously determined that
forfeiture is appropriate where the defaulting buyer has paid
ten percent of the purchase price in the context of an earnest
money contract. 1 0 The forfeiture is appropriate because the
liquidated damages bear a reasonable relation to the actual
damages sustained by the seller."' Similar reasoning supports
the application of forfeiture in the context of a land install-
ment contract. This approach protects the seller during the
initial stages of the contract when his risks are greatest, yet
allows the buyer the additional protections of a mortgage once
ten percent of the purchase price has been paid.
Although the proposed general rule will remedy many of
the problems of forfeiture, the Court should nonetheless be
willing to make exceptions to the ten percent rule in situa-
tions where notions of fairness and equity require a different
result. A case-by-case examination may be necessary to carry
out this approach, but in doing so, the interests of both buyer
and seller will best be served.
Allen K. Montgomery, Jr.
109 See notes 71-84 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the land
installment contract's effect on low income, "high-risk" buyers.
110 See 585 S.W.2d at 383.
" See id. at 383. See, e.g., Robert F. Simmons & Assocs. v. Urban Renewal &
Community Dev. Agency, 497 S.W.2d 705 (Ky. 1973); Graves v. Winer, 351 S.W.2d
193 (Ky. 1961); Ward Real Estate v. Childers, 3 S.W.2d 601 (Ky. 1928).

